Grand Strategy for Dummies
How to conquer the world
Preface: The following is a reflection piece from my favourite module of the year: Grand Strategy and the Foundations of Anglo-American Statecraft. I was prompted to do this after my seminar leader asked everyone for their core takeaway from 20 weeks on the module. I articulated my thoughts in 30 seconds, but I believe it deserved a fuller treatment.
Confusion Galore
There is a lot of confusion when discussing ‘grand strategy.’ In fact, I found myself confused for much of the module. But resigning to this confusion is intellectual laziness, so here I am, unpacking this bit by bit.
One glaring problem is that grand strategies are classified into labels and terminologies that confuse more than they clarify. For example, the term ‘doctrine’ is often attributed to Anglo-American leaders when referencing their grand strategies. When discussing these doctrines, they are often targeted at one specific policy rather than the entire strategy. (e.g. you cannot talk about Nixon’s détente with the USSR without also talking about Sino-US rapprochement).
It also gets problematic when commentators assert that America/Britain should do <insert proposed grand strategy>. A common example is the idea of a ‘liberal’ grand strategy vs a ‘realist’ grand strategy. This is associated with calls to “commit more resources for humanitarian assistance” and “just withdraw from its global engagements” respectively. The problem is not with the proposal per se but the inability to consider if there are resources available and what are the tradeoffs of diverting such resources to said new policy.
I believe that grand strategy is not advocacy work – it must be effective and do more than make the commentator feel good. The above confusions are often rooted in the inability to define the nature of grand strategy from the outset, and how it is made IRL. This is what I hope to clarify.
What is Grand Strategy?
“We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” – Lord Palmerston
We all have interests, and so do states. We also live in a world defined by competition, with actors not wanting us to get what we want. Grand strategy is what states do in a competitive world, as they seek to realise their interests with limited capabilities. Some people refer to this as a state’s theory of success.
It is ‘grand’ because it involves decision-making at the highest level of government, focused on integrating all instruments of the state (diplomatic, economic, military etc.).
It is ‘strategy’ because these high-level decisions are made through the process of balancing means (capabilities of states) with ends (interests/objectives of states). It is invariably the case that means are limited and ends are unlimited, perhaps that is the human condition. This is why the means-end balancing process will involve thinking deeply about a state’s priorities (what’s at stake, why is one thing more at stake than another) and the tradeoffs (what is to be sacrificed?) it would entail.
Formulating (the ‘Right’) Ends – The Process
Grand strategy is ends-focused, and thinking about how we ought to define and formulate these ends is an important starting point. It is obvious but ends should not be defined willy-nilly, by what sounds good rhetorically or by copying what has already been done.
The late football coach Brian Clough once said that: ‘We had a good team on paper. Unfortunately, the game was played on grass.’
Likewise, grand strategy is played on Earth and grand strategy documents need to do more than just sound good and make people feel good. (I call this Kumbaya politics)
Formulating ends properly requires first-order thinking. This is about avoiding the ‘what’ and focusing on the ‘why.’ This is about asking the ‘why’ question again and again and again. There must be absolute clarity of exactly why an objective is so important to the state, that a state is pursuing it as its grand strategic objective.
Invariably, states have multiple objectives (emphasis on the plural) pursued simultaneously. This will mean that hard choices will have to be made about prioritization, which would entail an understanding of tradeoffs. I have jotted down a list of guiding questions and frameworks regarding this process.
Guiding Questions
Why exactly are we doing what we are doing – specifically to what ends?
Why are you pursuing said objectives, what is the thought process behind it?
Why are those ends important – exactly how do they benefit the national interest? And in what order of importance?
What are the tradeoffs/dilemmas and which side of these do you stand on – contextually + across time?
Guiding Frameworks
(Tangible) Material vs (Intangible) Ideational
Military vs Economic
Security vs Values
Near-Abroad vs Far-Abroad
Long-Term vs Short-Term
The Prescriptivism Risk & How to Overcome It
Yet, this could easily veer into prescriptive, normative, and politically contentious arguments about what ought to be done without any agreement whatsoever. Such is the nature of issues that are political.
Nevertheless, the process can still be rescued from the rancour and rambunctiousness of political debate. It starts with acknowledging that ends can be aspirational, but they also need to be ruthlessly grounded in reality. For the Singaporean readers, I think this is what people miss about Lee Kuan Yew. His tough rhetoric often obscures his internal idealism.
Nevertheless, this is why Bismarck was also astute in saying that:
‘politics is the art of possible.’
It is an art because it requires fine judgment that is often based on a grand strategist’s instinct and perception of the kaleidoscope of developments occurring concurrently. Often it comes with experience of past failures, which is why the best strategists are often old.
For the young and inexperienced, History can thus be an invaluable tool. It is intellectual capital. History is about vicariously tapping on the experience of capable men and women who have grappled with similar issues. It is about taking the long view, thinking about what has changed and what hasn’t. This is why Bismarck is once again, astute in asserting that fools learn from experience and how he prefers to learn from the experiences of others.
For the literature-inclined, applying what is known as ‘tragic thinking’ could be useful here as well. (I am aware that this is a Western-centric intellectual tradition.) Tragic thinking comes from sieving ancient wisdom embedded in Greek Tragedies, a specific form of plays that the ancient Greeks partook in. Robert Kaplan published an accessible book on this recently. Essentially, he conceptualizes the art of formulating ends as (1) balancing freedom with order, and (2) balancing ambition with fear.
All this is not to say that the grand strategist should be detached from domestic politics. Henry Kissinger eloquently articulated that:
“no foreign policy – no matter how ingenious – has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the heart of none.” (And indeed, Kissinger fell on his own sword)
Domestic politics exert a certain influence on grand strategy contrary to the false assumptions of structural realists. This is also why Kissinger was right to say that:
“the statesman must therefore be an educator; he must bridge the gap between a people's experience and his vision, between a nation's tradition and its future.”
I have thus shown how grand strategy is related to history, literature and domestic politics. In short, it is about applying the ‘will this work?’ litmus test across many levels. To do so, it bears repeating that grand strategy is a means-end balancing process. No formulation of ends can be complete without a hard-headed consideration of what is realistically possible given the state’s limited capabilities. Further, thinking about the external environment matters too. We live in a world of competing grand strategies. There are threats presented by actors who do not want you to succeed that have to be factored in.
My final point on the formulation of grand strategy is the importance of thinking long-term. There are often fewer constraints in the longer term than there are in the immediate term. Good grand strategies have ends that expand means, allowing for expanded ends in the long run. This is why economic power is an intrinsically valuable objective, underpinning much of the rise and fall of great powers.
Having a common framework by which these objectives are discussed and debated that is grounded in reality will go a long way in saving grand strategy from the claws of political theatre or virtue-signalling. Don’t get me wrong: grand strategic debates are necessary. John Stuart Mill is instructive when he writes that:
‘it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.’
The point is to have healthy, constructive debates.
Even if this does not appear to be the case, it comes down to the appreciation that this is a high-stakes game. There is a saying that
“you can always survive a mistake in domestic affairs, but you can get killed by one made in foreign policy (which is the expression of grand strategy).”
And conversely, this is why Sayre's law is true:
"Academic politics is the most vicious and bitter form of politics, because the stakes are so low.”
Creatively Exploiting Means
Now we come to the discussion about exploiting means in grand strategy. This is the ‘how’ of grand strategy, the ‘craft’ of statecraft. This is where there is room for imagination, creativity and agency.
Of course, History can also be an inspiration. Here I am reminded of the Chinese saying: ‘万事俱备，只欠东风.’ It comes from the stratagem of Zhuge Liang, whose clairvoyant forecasting of foggy weather – the fog of war – led him to send straw dummies on ships to dupe his opponents to shoot arrows at them. In doing so, he gained 100,000 arrows for his army’s use.
The lesson here is that even if a state’s capabilities might invariably be limited, it does not mean that the grand strategist is helpless. Agency always plays a part in this process. It is about being smart with your resources, and scheming if needed. The Prussian strategist Clausewitz refers to this as ‘genius’, the ability to perceive and exploit opportunities and turn the tide of history in one’s favour. I have jotted down a list of guiding questions on means too.
Guiding Questions
How can these objectives identified be achieved with limited capabilities?
How can various capabilities be synergistically employed to serve our objective(s)?
Evaluating Grand Strategies
If grand strategy is about judiciously formulating ends and creatively employing means, then any appraisal of effectiveness/ineffectiveness should take into account this balancing act.
I found William James’ criteria of proportionality to be extremely useful because it helps us guard against hindsight bias. Essentially, the ideal grand strategy is one that is proportionate, striking a balance between means available and ends defined. Conversely, suboptimal grand strategies are disproportionate, either overstretching (ends>means) or under-committing (means>ends).
Okay, so what?
Conceptualizing grand strategy as a means-end balancing act is invaluable in helping to structure the analysis of the grand strategy of any state. It also is a helpful tool to structure one’s thoughts when thinking about the impact of any event on a state’s grand strategy. This, in my opinion, is what differentiates a ‘pracademic’ from an ivory tower academic and an analyst who is critical but fair and insightful from an armchair political commentator that you should listen to for entertainment purposes only.
If international relations is not your thing, these are entirely transferrable to the business world. For example, Jensen Huang’s recent advice is grand strategic as he evidences first-order thinking:
"have a core belief, gut check it every day, surround yourself with loved ones, and keep doing it."
Morals Matter!
Further, this would be useful as a self-help framework. You can use it to analyse one’s life or help others analyze theirs – if that happens to be something that is up your alley. And the note on which I would like to end is that this is not a Machiavellian exercise in world domination. I apologise if that is the impression I have given off, such is the tradeoffs of dispassionate analysis. Morality can, and should, IMO be a part of this process as well. I am no Christian but here’s Mark 8:36:
“For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his soul?”
Happy Easter!